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1. What do We knoW about public sector 
employment?
János Köllő
There have been surprisingly few studies looking at the public sector both in 
Hungary and internationally. One of the reasons is the absence of strong exog-
enous shocks: the size and relative earnings in the public sector have changed 
little in most countries and over time and this makes it difficult to differen-
tiate between real and spurious differences, as well as cause and effect. An-
other barrier is the lack of information: data often does not even allow us to 
distinguish between the public and private sectors. Another factor that quite 
possibly contributes to the lack of research interest is the fact that the objec-
tives of decision makers in the public sector are more difficult to define than 
those in the private sector and therefore it is difficult to put forward and test 
behavioural models (that are not based on ad hoc assumptions), and this is a 
serious competitive disadvantage to getting published.
Economists in Hungary are in a favourable position: measures of consecu-
tive governments – including the “Bokros package”, large pay rises before and 
after the 2002 general elections, pay cuts implemented after 2004 and recent 
austerity measures that also affect employment – created quasi experimental 
situations that allow the examination of a range of relationships which would 
be difficult to analyse under more stable circumstances. At the same time the 
availability of statistical data is relatively good. However, as will be argued 
below, even finding the key facts is a challenging task.
Size of the public sector
It is not easy to define who is part of the public sector. The law distinguishes 
between those with a work contract on the one hand, and public servants, civil 
servants, judges and prosecutors, or more recently governmental employees and 
public workers on the other. Those in employment are categorised according to 
the legal source of regulation (i.e. the Labour Code, Public Service Act etc.). A 
similar approach is adopted in the labour statistics of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), and the Wage Tariff Survey of the National Labour 
Office. Other sources of economic data distinguish the publicly-funded sector 
and the business sector, the latter including publicly-owned companies. Inter-
national comparison is made practically impossible by the fact that most data-
sets that would be potentially suitable for this only differentiate entire sectors 
that are predominantly public (education, health care, social care), however 
there is a large number of private companies operating in these sectors.1 At 
the same time there are many companies in the private sector that are fully 
1 With the exception of public 
administration where there are 
some international compara-
tive studies (for example OECD, 
2011).
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dependent on public institutions, either because they carry out outsourced ac-
tivities or because they only supply central or local government organisations. 
In Hungary, the picture is further complicated by an unusually large number 
of workers involved in publicly useful work programs. Where possible, they 
are excluded from analysis, however in some datasets it is impossible to sepa-
rate them from regular employees.
Table 1.1 shows that according to the CSO’s labour statistics and the Wage 
Tariff Survey public sector employees made up approximately 30% of the to-
tal number of people working in companies with 5 or more employees and 
government-funded organisations in 2013. Other types of data are available 
from the CSO’s Labour Force Survey. This makes no distinction between 
civil servants and public servants, however it does differentiate based on sec-
tor and ownership. According to this, employees of state-owned corporations 
and public institutions make up 27% of employment as defined by the ILO-
OECD and 33% of employees in 2011. (See Box 1.2 for an estimate of the 
workforce in public/local government-owned corporations). People employed 
in public administration, public education, health care and social care consti-
tuted 28% of employees and 22% of total employment. Although the figures 
vary with the definitions of “public sector” and “employment”, and affected 
by the inclusion or exclusion of public workers, the differences are relatively 
small: according to the latest available figures, approximately 30% of all employ-
ees and around one in four of those in employment worked in the public sector.
Table 1.1: Percentage of public sector workers in total employment  
and employee jobs in 2013 based on various sources
As % of total 
employment
As % of 
employees Time period
Institutional labour statistics
Public sector employees – 29.1a 2013
Wage Tariff Survey
Civil servants, public servants, judges, prosecutors, public workers – 31.4b May, 2013
Civil servants, public servants, judges, prosecutors – 27.2b May, 2013
Labour Force Survey
Employees of public corporations, public institutions, local 
governmentsc 27.2 32.5 1
st quarter, 2013
Employees of central or local government institutions in educa-
tion, health care or social care 22.4 27.8 1
st quarter, 2013
a CSO Stadat Table 2.1.33 (Data from June 23, 2014). The target population is public in-
stitutions, companies with five or more employees and some non-profit organisations.
b Author’s own calculation, observations weighted with coefficients provided by the 
National Labour Office. The target population is public institutions and businesses 
with five or more employees and non-profit organisations.
c Labour Force Survey, author’s own calculation. People in employment includes eve-
ryone who had done at least one hour of paid work in the previous week or who did 
not do any paid work but were away from work only temporarily.
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Naturally, it is considerably more difficult to estimate the number of private 
companies that are closely linked to the public sector. Using data from the 
CSO’s labour force survey Elek and Szabó (2013) concluded that 40% of shifts 
from the public to the private sector between 1998 –2002 did not involve a 
job change, suggesting large-scale outsourcing (for a summary of their study 
see Chapter 2.4 of this In Focus). Later, between 2002–2008, this was a lot 
less common. The number of private companies dependent on government 
purchases cannot be estimated without specialised surveys.
Within the public sector, the share of public administration and educa-
tion is 39 and 36 per cent respectively, while health and social care make up 
25 per cent. Fifty-seven per cent of public sector workers were employed by 
local governments in 2011, however this share had shrunk to 45 per cent by 
2013. Currently, central government constitutes the largest segment of the 
public sector (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Distribution of public sector employees by sector and level  
in the first quarter of 2013, in sectors dominated by public provision
Central Government Local Government Total
Public administration 25.2 14.0 39.2
Education 16.3 19.6 35.9
Health care 12.2 8.3 20.5
Social care 1.4 2.9 4.3
Total 55.1 44.8 100.0
Note: The definition of public sector is based on the sector and the ownership status 
of the employer. Figures also include the number of public workers.
Source: CSO Labour Force Survey, 1st quarter, 2013. Author’s calculation.
The probability of employment in the public sector largely depends on gender, 
education and age: in 2011 the share of public sector workers was 19% among 
men and 45% among women; 15% among those with completed primary edu-
cation and a vocational qualification, 27% among those with completed sec-
ondary education, 54% among those with higher education and 82% among 
those who did not complete primary education. The latter figure is so high 
because it includes people in public works programmes. Data from the Wage 
Tariff Survey show that the share of public sector employment increases with 
age (it is 22% among people in their twenties, 26% for those in their thirties, 
36% in their forties and it is 40% among those aged over 50).
Trends in employment and pay over time
The size of the public sector increased from 650 thousand to 800 thousand 
during the years of political transition when a number of activities previously 
carried out by the Party apparatus or state-owned enterprises were transferred 
to publicly-funded institutions (inspection, planning, supervision, welfare and 
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children’s services) and when new types of services were also created. The ex-
pansion was halted by the “Bokros package” launched in March 1995 that also 
resulted in a 10-per cent decrease in the number of public sector employees.
After the turn of the millennium their number started to increase again 
until 2006 when a high budget deficit resulted in measures to reduce employ-
ment (Figure 1.1). However, the size of the public sector declined only up to 
2008 and during the years of the crisis it stabilised – it even increased consid-
erably if the number of public workers is taken into account. The number of 
employees was 3% higher in the public sector in January – March 2011 than 
in the same period three years earlier, while in the private sector there was a 
4.8% fall. Nonetheless, the size of the public sector also later started to de-
cline. Its current size is best compared to its 2000 level when the number of 
public workers was still negligible: data indicates a loss of 130 thousand peo-
ple since that time. If the number of public works participants is included in 
the public sector workforce then an increase can be observed since 2008 and 
particularly since 2013 when public works programmes did not decline dur-
ing the cold season in November and December.
Figure 1.1: Employment in the public sector, 1986–2013 (thousand people)
Note: No comparable data is available on the numbers of the workforce in 
public works programmes before 2010.
Source: CSO Stadat and Wage Tariff Survey 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994–2003.
The employment statistics suggest a high level of instability – a 130-thousand 
increase after transition, followed by a decline of 60 thousand, and then an 
increase of the same magnitude, followed by another decrease by nearly 150 
thousand – but fluctuations in the level of public sector pay were even more 
marked. The public sector pay advantage or disadvantage compared to similar 
employees in terms of gender, age and education in the private sector fluctu-
ated within the range of –22 and +17 percentage points (Figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: Regression-adjusted pay advantage/disadvantage  
of the public sector 1986–2013 (percentage points)
Note: Regression estimates: on the left side of the equation it is the logarithm of pay 
and on the right side it is gender, number of years in education, labour market expe-
rience, its square and a public sector variable. The points measure the effect of the 
latter in percentage points.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994–2011. (Data is from May for each 
year. Prior to 1995 the Wage Tariff Survey only included companies with more than 
20 employees, and until 2000 with more than 10 employees.)
The “Bokros package” worsened the pay position of the public sector by more 
than 10 percentage points relative to the private sector. The narrowing of the 
pay gap continued between 1997–2000 but was later followed by a sharp in-
crease. The increase of the minimum wage by Mr. Orbán’s first Government 
had a strong impact on the public sector because in 2000, 60% of non-gradu-
ate public sector workers were earning less than 50 thousand forints per month, 
the minimum wage in 2002. (The same number was 40% in companies with 
more than four employees in the private sector.) Secondly, before the gener-
al election in May 2002, the Orbán Government significantly increased the 
pay of civil servants. As a result the average real pay increased by 17% in the 
public sector between May 2001 and 2002, compared to seven per cent in 
the private sector. Thirdly and most importantly, when the Medgyessy-led 
Government entered into office in May 2002 they increased the basic pay of 
public servants by 50% in line with their pre-election pledge (the increase was 
endorsed by all parliamentary parties). As a result the average pay of public 
servants increased by 29% in real terms between May 2002 and 2003, com-
pared to an increase of “only” 11% in the private sector. The pay disadvantage 
of the public sector (–6 percentage points in 2002) turned into a substantial 
pay premium: 11-percentage points in 2003 and 17 per cent in 2004.
The pay advantage, however, disappeared within three years. On the one 
hand, as is shown by Telegdy (2013) – summarised in Chapter 2.2 of this In 
in focus
48
Focus – pay in the private sector, particularly in jobs where workers can easily 
move between sectors, increased faster than average after 2003. On the other 
hand, the austerity measures introduced to reduce the large internal and ex-
ternal deficit in 2006 rapidly eroded the pay advantage of the public sector. 
Finally, the abolition of the additional 13th month pay of civil and public serv-
ants in 2009 meant an immediate drop of 12 percentage points in the rela-
tive pay level of the public sector. This was compounded by an informal but 
effective freeze of the basic pay of civil and public servants at the 2008-level. 
In 2012 the gradual pay increase of doctors and nurses was decided and in 
2013 teachers’ pay also increased, but these had not reversed the worsening 
trend by May 2013: public sector employees were paid 20% less than their 
counterparts – based on gender, age and education – in the private sector; 
just as in 1996, the second year of the “Bokros package”.
On instability in the public sector
This section presents some of the characteristics of Hungarian regulation that 
are essential for understanding the public sector labour market. The first is 
the extreme instability of the public sector’s relative pay level.
As has been shown the relative pay level of the public sector compared to 
the private sector fluctuated between the extremes of a more than 20-per-
centage-point pay disadvantage and a nearly 20-percentage-point wage pre-
mium since 1986. Such fluctuation of the pay gap was unprecedented in the 
European Union before the 2008 financial and economic crisis. (Even since 
then, only Romania experienced a loss of advantage comparable to Hungary, 
see Vasile, 2012.)
 Table 1.3: The range of pay gaps between the public and private sectors  
in selected countries between 1993 and 2000 (percentage points)
Country Minimum Maximum Difference
Austria 1.5 4.3 2.8
Finland –1.3 0.0 1.3
France –3.2 7.7 10.9
Germany 7.9 10.4 2.6
Greece 9.6 21.8 12.2
Holland 3.6 7.5 3.9
Ireland 16.3 21.9 5.6
Italy 10.3 12.1 1.8
Portugal 16.7 23.0 6.3
Spain 13.8 20.3 6.5
Hungary 1993–2000a –22.0 –3.8 18.2
Hungary 2001–2008b –11.6 17.7 29.3
a Compared to companies with more than 20 employees.
b Compared to companies with more than four employees.
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Note: Positive (negative) values indicate the pay advantage (disadvantage) of the 
public sector. Control variable in the Campos and Centeno (2012) study: gender, 
age, square age, education, marital status, years in service. Control variables for the 
Hungarian data: gender, age, square age, education.
Source: European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data from Table 5.1 in 
Campos and Centeno (2012). Values for Hungary are the author’s calculation based 
on data from the Wage Tariff Survey.
As data in Table 1.3 (based on Campos and Centeno, 2012 and our own calcu-
lations) indicate, the difference between the minimum and maximum value 
of the pay gap nowhere exceed 6.5 percentage points between 1993 and 2000, 
apart from in Greece and France. Meanwhile in Hungary the difference was 
18.2 percentage points in the same period and 29.5 percentage points in the 
following eight years. It should also be highlighted that in Greece the pay gap 
reached the 12.2 percentage points range as a result of a steady increase, and 
in France the pay gap ranged between –3 and +8 percentage points. Fluctua-
tions similar to the Hungarian ones – as well as the large pay disadvantage at 
the nadirs – are rather exceptional in developed market economies.2
The effect of pay rises and reductions on relative earnings
The second characteristic can be seen in the differences within the public 
sector: the highly paid benefitted more from the pay rises between 2000 and 
2004; however the decrease during the “Bokros package” in 1994–1996, and 
particularly the decline since 2004 also affected them the most. This is illus-
trated in Figure 1.3 with public servants who make up the largest group in 
the public sector. To create the figure, public servants were ranked into 100 
groups based on their pay for each year. For each percentile the ratio of their 
average pay to the national average was calculated. The graphs of Figure 1.3 
illustrate the changes in these relative pay indicators. A value of 1.0 means 
that the rate of increase or decrease was the same as in the general economy.
The austerity measures of the “Bokros package” had a somewhat stronger 
effect on the high earners except for the highest paid two per cent (99th and 
100th percentiles). In the “years of plenty” between 2000 and 2004, when the 
pay of public servants increased well above the national average, the pattern 
was more complex. There is a relatively large gain at the bottom of the dis-
tribution. There is a rapid increase in pay between the 10th and 70th percen-
tiles, especially towards the higher ranks. In the top third of the distribution 
– where basic pay constitutes a smaller part of pay and thus the effect of an 
increase is also smaller – the rate of pay increase is smaller; however it is still 
about a third higher than the national average.
Pay changes showed a U-shaped curve between 2004 and 2013. The pay of 
the lowest paid workers kept up with the national average thanks to the mini-
mum wage; however higher in the pay hierarchy there are increasing relative 
pay losses with the exception of the highest paid 10%, where towards the top 
2 However, Gimpelson and 
Lukiyanova (2009) find a very 
substantial pay disadvantage 
(26–28 percentage points ac-
cording to their regression es-
timates) in the Russian public 
sector in the early 2000s.
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the data show smaller relative losses. The top two per cent avoided the (rela-
tive) pay decrease affecting the majority of public sector workers altogether 
and they even had a modest increase.
Figure 1.3: Changes in the pay of public servants in comparison  
to the national average by pay percentiles, between different time periods (ratio)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
As a result of austerity measures since 2004, public sector pay declined to the 
level of the last “peace year” before the Bokros package. Figure 1.4 shows that 
the lowest paid public sector workers (percentiles 1–10, first decile) earned 
30–40% of the national average in 1994, and 40–50% in 2013. In both years, 
approximately one in four public servants was paid more than the national 
average. At the same time, the distribution of earnings became more bal-
anced: the gradient towards the lower end of the distribution was less steep 
in 2013 than in 1994.
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Figure 1.4: Pay of public servants compared to the national average, 1994, 2013 
(Wage Tariff Survey, percentage)
Note: To calculate the national averages only data from companies with more 
than 20 employees was taken into account. The 200–300 percentage values for 
the 99th and 100th percentiles were not included to ensure clarity of the figure.
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 1994, 2013.
The age-earnings profile of college/university graduates
The third characteristic is the distinctive age-earnings profile of graduate pub-
lic and civil servants. Earlier studies (see for example Varga’s 2008 paper on 
the teacher labour market) have already highlighted the U-shaped relative pay 
profile of graduate public servants: the pay disadvantage of the youngest and 
the oldest is considerable smaller than in the middle cohorts. This is because 
the regulations set a linear wage path for public servants and civil servants 
while in the private sector graduate – particularly university graduate – pay 
follows a strongly non-linear pattern: starting from a low level it increases 
rapidly then starts to decline towards the end of the career path.
Figure 1.5 shows that graduate school leavers earn 20–30 per cent less than 
their counterparts with a similar education and age in the private sector. Their 
disadvantage increases to 50–60 per cent around the age of 40. The disad-
vantage is smaller in the older cohort, it returns to the 25–30 per cent range. 
The pay disadvantage of college graduates is somewhat smaller, but the rela-
tive age-earnings curve shows a similar pattern.
The U-shaped curve, which essentially resulted from a legislative error in 
the early 1990s that has not been corrected since, has important implications. 
Firstly, young graduates entering public service face a continuous decline in 
relative pay in the first 15 years of their career and thus staying in public ser-
vice means an increasing relative pay loss each year.
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Figure 1.5: Graduate pay in the public sector compared to private sector employees  
of similar age and education, 2013 (percentage)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 2013.
Secondly, in austere years, such as 2013, the disadvantage of middle cohorts 
can become extreme. Even if there are a number of non-pay rewards to set 
against the pay disadvantage (such as greater job security, longer holiday enti-
tlement, feeling of usefulness, power in some areas, privileges, gratuities and 
income from corruption in others), according to international experience, a 
pay disadvantage of this extent – 50–60 per cent – is generally not permit-
ted by legislation in developed market economies.
Thirdly, the U-shaped curve is so marked that it can influence the devel-
opment of the relative pay of some birth cohorts in calendar time. If pay goes 
up in the public sector, its effect can be partly or fully offset by the fact that 
young people lose relative to their counterparts in the private sector each year 
until the age of 30–35 years. However, in older groups the effect of age adds 
to the effect of pay increase along the age-earnings profile: after the age of 35 
years graduates in the public sector move closer to private sector employees 
even without a sectoral pay increase.
This is illustrated by Figure 1.6 which follows the development of pay of 
four birth cohorts whose members were 55, 45, 35, or 28 years old in 2003. 
(People who were 25 in 2003, were still secondary school students at the be-
ginning of the observations, therefore a slightly older cohort was selected.) 
The figures are based on information from the Electronic Register of the Cen-
tral Administration of National Pension Insurance (in Hungarian: Országos 
Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság Központi Elektronikus Nyugdíj-nyilvántar-
tási Rendszere; “Kelen” for short) that has enough observations to enable an 
analysis by birth cohorts. The curves show the effect of pay rises before and 
after the 2002 general election. The substantial disadvantage of the two older 
cohorts turned into a significant advantage, while in the case of the younger 
cohorts, the pay increases were enough only to stabilise their position – they 
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were still at a substantial disadvantage compared to their counterparts in the 
private sector even in the best years. This also implies that in years when pay 
is decreasing, younger cohorts are especially worse off.
Figure 1.6: Pay in graduate jobs in selected cohorts, 1998–2008 (percentage)
Indicator: employment status and daily pay calculated from the annual income of 
public servants/civil servants who had been in continuous employment during the 
year, expressed as a percentage of the average of the total sample.
Source: Kelen, 20 per cent sample.
Public sector pay and the gender wage gap
The fourth characteristic that should be highlighted is the impact of pay fluc-
tuations in the public sector on the situation of women. If the size of the two 
sectors, the proportion of women within the sectors and their pay disadvan-
tages remains stable (the latter stabilised after 1993 in Hungary), then there 
will be a linear relationship between public sector pay and the gender pay gap. 
This is a rather trivial relationship, however its strength is noteworthy – this 
is highlighted by Figure 1.7. The horizontal axis of the graph indicates the 
regression-adjusted pay disadvantage (controlled for age and education) of the 
public sector. The vertical axis represents the gender pay gap in the overall econ-
omy using similar controls. The curve and the years indicate how the labour 
market moved within these coordinates in Hungary between 1994 and 2011.
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Figure 1.7: Public sector and the gender pay gap,  
1994–2013 (points on the logarithm)
Source: Wage Tariff Survey.
The points are essentially aligned on a straight line that has a gradient of 0.32. 
In other words, a 10-per-cent decline in the pay level of the public sector, in-
creases the pay disadvantage of women by 3.2 per cent.3 Considering the wide 
fluctuations of relative pay in the public sector, it seems justified to argue that 
the budgetary and political cycles of the past 20 years had the strongest effect 
on the labour market disadvantage of women.
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